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On 28 January 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) announced that Huawei will be allowed to build part of the country’s 5G core 
network. The United States (US), citing Huawei equipment’s high-risk 
nature to critical infrastructures, responded with threats of restricting 
intelligence cooperation. A few months earlier, 15,000 kilometres to 
the southeast, Australia announced that it would exclude Chinese 
equipment from its 5G networks, unsurprisingly prompting outcry and 
threats from China.1 The UK appears not to have bought into the concept 
of “technological spheres of influence,” while Australia has. Australia’s 
actions should decrease Chinese control over technology there 
through exclusion; UK actions should allow for a mixed technological 
environment within its territory.  
Although controlling technology and its supply remains important, 
the fight over technological governance is equally crucial. Since the 
early days of the Internet, the US has advocated placing companies 
and non-state actors at the core of technological and Internet 
governance, while China has always advocated for a strong state 
role. Both China and the US have also always pushed for their visions 
to be adopted by other states: the US through its Internet freedom 
agenda and China via its concept of Internet sovereignty.2
The US’s and China’s vying for technological influence has 
brought about the emergence of technological spheres of influence. 
These technological spheres of influence are geographical areas in 
which an external power has privileged but not exclusive capability 
to control technology and/or where the external actor exerts 
predominant influence in terms of technology governance. 
The term sphere of influence is a product of geopolitics. The British 
politician Lord Curzon purportedly first used the term in the mid 19th 
century, crediting the Russian foreign minister for mentioning it in 
relation to Afghanistan.3 Throughout history, technology has played a 
fundamental role in the practice of geopolitics—predominantly as an 
enabler of land or sea power. In the 21st century, as the Internet and 
associated technologies (hard infrastructure, Internet-of-things  devices, 
smartphones) are now at the centre of what constitutes influence, the 
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geopolitical importance of technology continues to 
grow. These new realities warrant an examination 
of what technological spheres of influence are. 
Privileged caPability to 
control technology 
One has to assume that the US and China have the 
capability to control every state’s Internet-connected 
technology, if they wish so. They might have greater 
sway over some states, such as the US over the UK 
and Japan, or China over Thailand and Malaysia, 
because these states rely more heavily on one or the 
other superpower for their technology procurement. 
If many critical components of a nation’s 5G Internet 
infrastructure, hardware, and software are of US 
and/or Chinese origin, it gives the US and/or China 
easier access to snoop or disrupt that country’s 
online communications.4 Being a key technology 
supplier allows the supplier privileged capability to 
control a customer state. This was seen in the recent 
revelations that the US and German intelligence 
agencies owned Crypto AG, a Swiss cryptographic 
equipment maker, which allowed them to snoop on 
dozens of countries.5 The US used this capability 
to spy on Argentinian communications during the 
Falklands War (shared with the UK) and Iranian 
leaders during the hostage crisis, thus demonstrating 
how control over technology can enhance other forms 
of statecraft.6 Still, this privileged capability to exert 
control is not exclusive. A Cisco router may give the 
US a head start in hacking a device, but this does not 
prevent Iran or China from gaining access as well. 
There are only a few places trending towards 
becoming exclusively Chinese or US technospheres. 
Thailand, for instance, has moved towards 
strongly relying on Chinese technology, while 
Japan has shunned Chinese technology.
These technological 
spheres of influence 
are geographical 
areas in which an 
external power has 
privileged but not 
exclusive capability 
to control technology 
and/or where the 
external actor exerts  
predominant 
influence in terms 
of technology 
governance.
‘‘
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Predominant influence in terms 
of technology governance 
The spheres of technological governance 
have become more exclusive. Norway, for 
instance, is an adherent to the US approach 
of allowing non-state actors and private 
companies to govern technology and the 
Internet. In adhering to the US model, 
Norway also accepts US-promoted norms, 
such as Internet freedom. As a result, both 
in practice and in principle, Norway falls 
within the US’ sphere of influence, and it is 
unlikely that this will change any time soon.
varying degrees of influence: 
core and PeriPhery  
of technosPheres 
Most countries are within the US and 
Chinese peripheral technospheres. In the 
periphery, the respective hegemon has 
privileged capability to control devices 
abroad due to its dominant technological 
supplier status. And yet, the US and China 
have little influence over technology 
governance here. For example, while the US 
may be able to easily exploit critical parts 
of Thailand’s Internet infrastructure, it has 
little influence over Thailand’s approach to 
Internet governance, whose cyber security 
laws and content controls largely mimic 
China’s environment. Indeed, China and 
the US have both privileged control over 
technology and hold considerable influence 
over how technology is governed in a small 
but increasing number of states. These 
states fall within the US/Chinese core 
technospheres (See the below analysis of 
Thailand and Japan as examples of core 
technospheres). 
no mutual recognition of 
resPective technosPheres
Historically, an important attribute of 
spheres of influence has been the mutual 
understanding amongst great powers of 
whose spheres of influence are situated 
where.7 There was, for example, little risk 
for Cold War-era escalation within Eastern 
Figure 1. Concentric circles of influence consist of the hegemon, the core and  
                 the periphery of its technosphere.
Concentric circles of influence
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Europe because both the US and Soviet 
Union understood this to be the latter’s 
sphere of influence.8 Hence when there was 
an uprising, the US did not openly intervene 
to foster further protests. In the digital realm, 
however, there is only sparse recognition of 
mutual technospheres. Indeed, both China 
and the US have threatened Germany, one 
example of a disputed technosphere, with 
sanctions as the country decides about core 
5G mobile infrastructure.9 
the most Prized technosPhere: 
the technological crescent 
Many geostrategists have placed Eurasia 
at the centre of history’s geopolitical pivot. 
Throughout history, this swath of land has 
harboured major geopolitical players, from 
the Romans to the Mongols to the Manchus. 
Each empire used the area’s abundant 
resources to acquire immense power—with 
the western, southern, and eastern fringes 
being especially vital, as Nicholas Spykman 
observed in the middle of the twentieth 
century.10 This paper, therefore, designates 
the combination of Europe, South(east) Asia, 
and East Asia as the world’s Technological 
Crescent, the most prized territory over 
which great powers are seeking to gain 
influence. It contains states with important 
rare earth resources (China, India, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam), which 
are used to produce high-tech products.11 
It also plays host to the world’s technology 
supply chain and innovation hubs, spanning 
from China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, 
Thailand, through to Germany, France, and 
the UK. In addition, the territory houses 
companies such as ARM, BBK Electronics, 
Bosch, Foxconn, Fujitsu, Huawei, Infineon, 
Samsung, Siemens, as well as cyber powers 
like Iran and Israel. 
The Technological Crescent’s geopolitical 
importance also bears more traditional 
characteristics. It is here that two of the 
three largest economic, military, and 
technological political entities—China 
and the EU—interact. It is more critical of 
a geographical pivot than the Eurasian 
hinterland. Russia, the preeminent power 
there, while still important (especially 
regarding its cyber-attack and information 
warfare capabilities), is a waning power 
with an economy the size of Italy’s 
and almost no companies that provide 
technology or services beyond its borders. 
It is thus increasingly apparent that Russia 
and the region at large—which includes 
states such as Kazakhstan, Mongolia, 
and Uzbekistan—do not represent 
the most vital technological area.
analysing us and chinese 
technosPheres within the 
technological crescent
The following section examines states at 
the eastern, southeastern, and western 
fringes of the Crescent—Japan, Thailand, 
and the UK—and analyses how they fit in the 
respective US and Chinese technospheres. 
It is evident that neither China nor the 
US have yet gained a dominant influence 
in the Crescent, largely because the 
geographical area is too technologically and 
governmentally mixed. 
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Japan is at the core of the US technosphere 
and is, unsurprisingly, one of the few countries that 
entirely prohibited Huawei and ZTE from providing its 
5G infrastructure. Japan, in this respect, followed the 
US’s decision to ban the two Chinese providers from 
supplying critical technology, citing national security 
concerns. This evinces an intentional technological 
decoupling from China, leaving behind technology 
largely produced by South Korean, Southeast 
Asian, and American or European companies. 
At the same time, Japan remains a staunch 
advocate of a multi-stakeholder model of Internet 
governance and online freedoms domestically and 
internationally, following the US-promoted norm 
of regulating Internet-connected technology. 
Thailand, for its part, is increasingly switching 
away from US technology, thanks largely to Chinese 
economic incentives that have enticed Bangkok to 
adopt Beijing’s preferred hardware and software. In 
fact, a whole new Chinese-provided technological 
ecosystem—one built to be independent from the 
US—is emerging in Thailand. This ecosystem spans 
5G infrastructure, a satellite network, surveillance 
systems, and deepened research cooperation. 
Huawei is already on the way to becoming a 
monopolistic mobile Internet supplier.12 China also 
provides substantial surveillance equipment to 
Thai police and government authorities.13 In 2013, 
Thailand reached a $297 million agreement with 
China to foster the utilisation of China’s satellite 
navigation network, Beidou, in Thailand’s  transport 
sector, for its disaster relief, and power distribution.14 
Expanding Beidou’s footprint in Thailand is ultimately 
part of China’s larger aim to extend the Beidou 
Navigation Satellite System’s reach by 3000 miles, 
far into Southeast Asia and South Asia, with both 
commercial and military applications. Beidou hopes 
to increase the  accuracy of internet of things (IoT) 
device location independently from the US’s Global 
It is likely that  
US-China 
competition will, 
in the short term, 
focus on larger and 
pivotal Eurasian 
states—such as 
Germany, France, 
Japan, and South 
Korea—aiming to 
draw them deeper 
into their respective 
technospheres.
‘‘
‘‘
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The current 
technological 
supply chains 
are so deeply 
intertwined 
that further 
decoupling would 
be very costly.
‘‘
‘‘
Positioning System (GPS).15 Concurrently, Thailand’s 
regime has continuously cracked down on its political 
opposition and is one of the worst countries in terms 
of online freedoms.16 Bangkok is here mirroring Beijing, 
imposing a very state-centric system that relies heavily 
on censorship and repressive cyber security laws.
Additionally, the United Kingdom rejects the 
concept of exclusive technospheres, believing instead 
that the international technological landscape is 
better off with a panoply of suppliers and providers. 
London continues to prioritise economic competition 
over national security posturing, contending that 
the imposition of safeguards can mitigate any 
risks. The UK, in this sense, does in practice reflect 
the belief of the US Principal Deputy Director of 
National Intelligence Susan Gordon, that “you 
have to presume a dirty network.”17 In this vein, 
the capping of the market share of a high-risk 
supplier is reasonable. The UK does, however, also 
strongly rely on Chinese-produced surveillance 
equipment. There is less clarification as to how 
potential security breaches would be countered on 
this front. Little is known, for instance, about how 
the UK mitigates risks that come with the Hikvision 
equipment that is installed in London’s boroughs of 
Kensington, Hackney, Camden, and used by police, 
universities, and hospitals throughout the country.18 
Still, the UK, while refusing to become too reliant on 
one great power for technology procurement, is one of 
the most active advocates for freedoms online and a 
governance model of Internet-connected technologies 
that relies on non-state actors. It has long pushed this 
agenda, most notably with a pioneering conference 
on cyberspace in 2011 that aimed to further online 
freedoms.19 In short, UK actions and discourse are 
a flagship example of multi-stakeholderism.20 
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Map 1. Note how China’s land and maritime silk roads enclose the Eurasian Technological 
Crescent from the North and South.20
the future of technosPheres
Future technosphere development remains 
very much open. One possibility is a global 
bifurcation into two technospheres. In 
this scenario, countries such as Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand choose to rely 
on US technology, and to a lesser extent on 
some European providers such Ericsson 
and Nokia, while states such as Iran and 
Russia actively remove US-produced 
components from their networks and 
replace them with native or Chinese-built 
ones, citing national security concerns. 
Other states may be driven into American 
or Chinese technospheres by financial 
incentives. Malaysia and Thailand do not 
rely on China because of their hostility 
towards the US but rather because of 
the cheapness of Chinese technology, 
which often comes concurrently with 
development aid and Belt and Road 
Initiative infrastructure projects. A 
bifurcation is especially likely if China and 
the US increasingly pressure these states 
to pick sides.21
It is likely that US-China competition 
will, in the short term, focus on larger 
and pivotal Eurasian states (such as 
Germany, France, Japan, South Korea), 
aiming to draw them deeper into their 
respective technospheres. If these 
states choose to do so, it will have a 
ripple effect on smaller states. However, 
if these pivotal states resist US and 
Chinese pressure, they may prevent a 
global technospherical bifurcation.  
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Such bifurcation should be avoided. 
The current technological supply chains 
are so deeply intertwined that further 
decoupling would be very costly. Indeed, 
as it became apparent during the 5G 
debate, excluding Huawei and ZTE from 
supplying equipment would shut out 40 
percent of the competition. This would 
likely have pecuniary disadvantages for 
customer countries.22 Fewer technological 
competitors would ensure diminished 
competition in the cyber security market.
For all the above reasons, larger and/
or pivotal states in Eurasia (e.g. France, 
Germany, etc.) should work towards 
preventing the further emergence of 
technospheres. Accordingly, these 
countries should help countries resist 
US and Chinese pressure. European 
actors could accomplish this by 
establishing a continental body to vet 
technologies of critical importance and 
impose a cap on the market share of 
those suppliers likely to dominate. 
In terms of technological governance, 
however, factionalization will likely deepen. 
States that otherwise resist technological 
bifurcation within their country (e.g. the UK) 
are strongly placed in the multi-stakeholder 
group of countries when it comes to 
the governance of technology. Although 
states may be unwillingly caught between 
Chinese and American pressures, there is 
almost no resistance to establishing two 
zones of thinking about the governance 
of technology—one where the state is at 
the centre of power and another where 
a group of stakeholders such as private 
companies and individuals hold power 
concurrently with the state. The increasing 
popularity of the former state-centric model 
is worrisome given that this system is 
generally accompanied by a deterioration of 
citizens’ fundamental freedoms. To counter 
this challenge, countries that subscribe 
to the multi-stakeholder model should 
draft a strategic narrative that highlights 
their model’s advantages in comparison 
to the state-centric model. At the same 
time, they should focus on crafting a 
legal framework for governing emerging 
surveillance technologies that protects 
the rights and privacy of citizens. In other 
words, they should lead by example. 
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The deterioration of Sino-American relations and 
the rise of novel forms of statecraft have given 
way to a worrying new feature of the international 
system: technological spheres of influence. In this 
Strategic Update, Valentin Weber explains how we 
have arrived at this novel geopolitical arrangement, 
where in the world the greatest contestation lies, 
and what the future of technospheres may hold. 
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